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PRAGMATIC IDEALISM AND THE
SCHOLARSHIP OF MEL DURCHSLAG
William P. Marshallt
Mel Durchslag is an unrepentant idealist. He graduated law school
in 1965, during an era where constitutional rights were undergoing
dramatic expansion in the decisions of the Warren Court and when
law was treated as an agent of social change in the classrooms and
corridors of the nation's most prestigious law schools. He continued
in this tradition after law school when he was awarded a Reginald
Heber Smith Fellowship, a prestigious honor given to outstanding law
graduates dedicated to fighting for principles of social justice. Indeed,
being a "Reggie," as it was then called, was testament both to Mel's
idealism and his outstanding legal abilities-as the Fellowship was
given only to the absolutely best of the best.
Not surprisingly to those of us lucky to know him, Mel has
maintained his idealism throughout his academic career. His
scholarship reflects a commitment to helping the underdog and the
disenfranchised. He has been devoted to the work and cause of the
American Civil Liberties Union-perhaps the archetypical idealistic
legal organization. His classes have reverberated with passionate
testimony to the power of ideas.
But, unlike many in the academy, Mel's idealism has always been
grounded in a strong sense of realism. Although Mel has always been
one of the guiding voices in the academy arguing for a robust
interpretation of individual rights in the Constitution, he has also been
one of the leading advocates for a realistic approach as to how such
rights should be identified and enforced. Maybe it is because his areas
of expertise include Local Government Law as well as Constitutional
Law that he has been deeply aware of the practical necessities
imposed by limited resources, but, for whatever the reason, Mel has
t Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
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always had a keen eye for the pragmatic limits of legal doctrine.
Thus, for example, he has written that individual rights could not be
broadly defined without limiting the remedies attached to those rights
or else the strains on state and local government would become
excessive.' He has shown that the question of whether affirmative
rights exist in the Constitution cannot be answered without
considering how the enforcement of those rights could be squared
with the institutional limitations of the judiciary.2 And he has
demonstrated how welfare rights could not be meaningfully
recognized unless the fiscal restraints faced by the states were also
acknowledged.3
Significantly, the methodology that Mel utilizes in his analysis is
something far different than balancing. His point is not simply that in
any given case, the exercise of an individual's right should be
balanced against the state's interests in opposition.4 In Mel's
jurisprudence there is a necessary step before balancing. Practical
necessities and institutional concerns must be taken into account in
determining the existence and scope of a constitutional right.
Perhaps this pragmatic aspect of Mel's thinking is nowhere more
apparent that in his discussion of Dandridge v. Williams 5 and the
limits of the Equal Protection Clause as it relates to the rights of the
poor. 6 Dandridgewas a case that broke the hearts of many at the time
it was decided because it rejected the notion, then popular in
academic thought,7 that classifications affecting welfare regulations
should merit heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause,
either because poverty should be considered a suspect class or
because access to subsistence should be considered a fundamental
right.8 In Dandridge, however, the Supreme Court ruled that welfare

I Melvyn R. Durchslag, Federalism and ConstitutionalLiberties: Varying the Remedy to
Save the Right, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 723 (1979).
2 Melvyn R. Durchslag, Constraintson Equal Access to FundamentalLiberties: Another
Look at ProfessorMichelman 's Theory of Minimum Protection, 19 GA. L. REV. 1041 (1985).
3 Melvyn R. Durchslag, Welfare Litigation, the Eleventh Amendment and State

Sovereignty: Some Reflections on Dandridge v. Williams, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 60 (1975)
[hereinafter Durchslag, Welfare Litigation].

4 See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 981 n.231 (1987)
5 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
6 Durchslag, Welfare Litigation,supra note 3.
7 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On
Protectingthe Poor Through the FourteenthAmendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).

8 The specific question in Dandridge was whether the state could establish a maximum
welfare grant to a family regardless of the level of need: i.e., could the state provide the same
level of benefits to a family of eight as it did to a family of five despite the fact that the former
obviously needed more assistance. Dandridge,397 U.S. at 472-76.
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regulations
should be reviewed only under minimal rational basis
9
scrutiny.
The result in the case was clearly anathema to Mel.' 0 But he
skillfully explained why the Court ruled as it did, and, as a corollary
to this analysis, suggested why the plaintiffs may have been wrong to
initiate the litigation in the first place. As Mel pointed out, the driving
concern for the Court in Dandridge (and other cases seeking
heightened scrutiny for wealth based classifications such as Jefferson
v. Hackney" and San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriquez' 2) was not the recognition of a fundamental right to
subsistence or the recognition of the poor as a suspect class. Rather,
the concern was the threat that heightened scrutiny would pose to the
state's ability to control its expenditures, a matter that cut to the heart
of the state's essential sovereignty.' 3 With this value at stake then, it
was no wonder that the Court would be reluctant to recognize a
competing constitutional right.
As Mel wrote:
[Whether] compelled by a specific constitutional provision or
not, the Court is sensitive to the issue of state sovereignty.
Indeed, cases like Dandridge, Jefferson, and Rodriguez may
be better understood as sovereignty cases than as equal
protection cases. More importantly, parties raising issues
where the appropriation or allocation of state dollars is the
basic focus must be sensitive to the sovereignty issue. The
plaintiffs in Dandridge and Jefferson may have failed, not
because of a myopic Court but because they tried to push the
Constitution too hard and too fast. What resulted from the
push was an interpretation of the equal protection clause
which will plague 4welfare (and education) reformers for a
long time to come.1
Thirty-eight years after Dandridge was decided, Mel Durchslag has
been proved exactly right, and the constitutional rights of the poor
9 Id. at 485-86.
10Durchslag, Welfare Litigation, supranote 3, at 98 ("[L]et me reiterate that I do not like
the result in Dandridge v. Williams."); id. at 99 ("What is most tragic about cases like
Dandridge,in addition to the result that now some welfare recipients are likely to starve more
than others .... ).
11406 U.S. 535 (1972).
12411 U.S. 1 (1973).
13 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (holding the state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity was tied to the protection of its treasury).
14Durchslag, Welfare Litigation,supranote 3, at 100.
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remain unrecognized. Dandridge stands as a lesson to those who
would ignore Mel's pragmatic lessons.
There are numerous other areas of law where Mel Durchslag's
writings have proved prescient, persuasive, and compelling. The
Eleventh Amendment, for example, is an area of constitutional law
where Mel has developed a particular mastery. His book on the
Eleventh Amendment 5 is one of the most important guides to the
subject that exists in the literature, and his analysis of the treatment of
local government immunity under the Eleventh Amendment 16 is the
definitive treatment of that issue.
But Mel's importance as an academic transcends just his particular
writings. He has participated in countless academic events and
conferences-each time contributing more than his share to the
overall quality of the program. He has improved the scholarship of
others by tirelessly reading and commenting on their work. He has
trained a generation of lawyers to immerse themselves in legal
doctrine and theory and to not rest with easy answers.
And he has also contributed remarkably to the fabric of legal
thought on a daily basis merely by the strength of his presence and his
natural inquisitiveness. Mel, quite simply, is an intellectual catalyst. I
do not know how many writings of others that Mel has triggered
merely by his off-handed comments in casual conversation, but I
know from personal experience they are legion. (Indeed, I remember
Mel once stating in a hallway conversation that he believed that the
importance of separation of powers was that it was designed to
protect individual freedom. A short time later Justice Scalia wrote in
Morrison v. Olson that the "[t]he purpose of the separation and
equilibrium of powers in general . . . was not merely to assure
'7
effective government but to preserve individual freedom."'
Coincidence? I am not sure.)
Mel, in short, is a scholar's scholar. Through his writings, he has
helped change the shape of American constitutional law. Through his
friendship, collegiality, and intellectual curiosity, he has bettered the
work of those around him. We are all deeply indebted to him.

15MELVYN R. DURCHSLAG, STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2002).
16 Melvyn R. Durchslag, Should PoliticalSubdivisions Be Accorded Eleventh Amendment
Immunity?, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 577 (1994)
17Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

